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ABSTRACT: The paper suggests a framework for evaluating the relevance of strategies of 
private sector development in fostering sustained economic turnaround in fragile and 
post-conflict situations. It highlights how fragility, violence and conflict change 
economic structures, introducing distortions, trapping agents into “short-termism” and 
changing incentives toward rent-seeking, and explores strategies for supporting shifting 
economic systems from predation to production. 
 
JEL: D72, D74, O17, O40 
 
                                                 
*
 Nadia F. Piffaretti, npiffaretti@worldbank.org. 
2 
 
3 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
i. Fragility, Economic Development and Turnaround 
 
Fragile states are characterized by marked propensity to relapse into crisis due to 
limited resiliency and persistent vulnerability to internal and external shocks. As many as 
40% of fragile states fall back into crisis within 10 years (Walter 2004). Among the key 
causes of persistent vulnerability and risk of violence is failure to enter economic 
development is a key root cause of conflict (Collier et al., 2003). Blomberg and Hess 
(2002) find that the links between internal and external violence and prosperity are strong 
and mutually reinforcing, with recession increasing the probability of conflict. Economic 
Development has been shown to play a critical role in reducing the risk of relapsing into 
conflict and violence (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002, Elbadawi 2003).  
Evidence suggests that supporting growth in low income countries is the best 
strategy to reduce conflict risk, diversify the economy and finally promote long term 
stability, and ultimately peace and prosperity in Africa (Collier 2009a). Collier (2009b) 
calls for economic development as the “true exit strategy” for international peacekeeping. 
Accordingly, donors and multilateral development institutions have developed a 
multi-pronged approach to development in low income countries focused on program of 
reforms which are simultaneously aimed at stabilizing the macro-framework, building 
capacity and governance quality (mainly through strengthening of Public Finance 
Management parameters), supporting private sector development through regulatory 
reforms, and improve income-generating activities for the state (facilitating exploitation 
of natural resources often present, and export of wood and crops). 
 
The return of sustained and permanent growth in fragile states and post-conflict 
affected situations has however proven to be particularly difficult and lengthy process. As 
micro and macro-insecurity persist at high levels after peace agreements are signed 
(Collier and Gunning 1995)  reconciliation does not generate an immediate boost to the 
economy, While peace generates a quick windfall, immediate peace-dividends are small 
and recovery of private sector confidence is the key for accessing a (delayed) peace-
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dividend (Collier 2005). On the other hand, initiating a turnaround is a lengthy process: 
Chauvet and Collier (2008) calculate that the mathematical expectation of fragile states 
entering turnaround phases is over 54 years. Fragile states faces a growth conundrum that 
can place them in a fragility trap. 
Hence the importance of pursuing economy recovery strategies “with vigor” 
(Collier 2006) and present early good economic choices to ensure that conflict risk 
diminishes permanently after the first decade after peace.  
 
It is against this backdrop that private sector developments strategies in fragile 
states have received renewed interest from international agencies and donors. Private 
sector development programs are now being proposed early on and integrated into peace-
building and state-building activities
†
  
Early lessons on the ground have led to important principles being integrated in 
the design of private sector development activities. On the one hand international 
agencies (UN 2009) are stressing the importance of initiating planning for transition to 
long-term sustained private sector development in the early phases of support from the 
international community, along with stabilization and local reintegration strategies. On 
the other hand, there is widespread agreement that private sector development should be 
approached with conflict sensitive programs designed around countries context.  
 
ii. Different Approaches to Private Sector Development 
 
Programs come in the form of targeted support to individual economic agents, 
systemic support to sectors or markets, reform of the business climate, strengthening of 
economic structure (DCED 2008). Support to private sector development in fragile states 
cover a very broad range of different activities, including support to development of „non 
profit” private sector (as a complementary vehicle to deliver services when public 
capabilities are particularly weak, or not available to part of the population), through 
                                                 
†
 OED 1998 review of World Bank‟s support to Post-conflict countries stressed that the Bank‟s approach to assisting 
basic production sectors, including industry, “has been for the most part indirect, and concentrating on policy and 
institutional enabling environments and on infrastructure”. The performance of operations in support to microenterprise 
has been mixed. 
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market integrated interventions, private and public partnerships, and cooperation with 
multinational corporations keen on building on political stabilization to invest in 
exploiting natural resources and export-staples. 
Donors‟ frameworks can be broadly categorized into two major approaches 
(DCED 2008).  
Following the “investment climate approach” states are encouraged to develop a 
program of reforms (at macro-, fiscal and regulatory levels) to improve overall business 
climate parameters with the goal of laying the foundations for broad-based economic 
growth, encouraging both foreign and local investments. Investment climate reforms 
include promoting regulatory reform, reducing red-tape, strengthening of competition 
policy, improvement of property rights and their enforcement. Reforms also include 
measures to increase formality, as informality is seen as allowing predation-driven over 
production-driven sectors, and. 
These comprehensive reforms to improve the quality of the state and the business 
environment face different sets of challenges. On the one hand, their chances of success, 
which require a lengthy development of the program of reforms, is strongly constrained 
by the time constraint posed by the very substantial probability that countries fall back 
into violence within a decade if sustained growth does not develop.  As Hausman, Rodrik 
and Velasco (2008) put it, the search for comprehensive programs of reforms has given 
raise to “laundry lists of needed reforms” which is extremely difficult to handle in fragile 
situations due to the very weak institutional capacity and legitimacy
‡
. On the other hand, 
as Fisher (2006)  remarks, the design of comprehensive programs of reforms rarely takes 
into account that the prevalence of rent-seeking which characterizes the country context 
in fragile states makes reforms themselves vulnerable to capture by rent-seekers. 
More recently, more so-called “interventionist” approaches has been brought to 
the fore, with the goal of accelerating the transition from conflict to sustained 
development through programs of support to emerging industries. Its proponents point 
out that changes in regulations and laws are not bound to produce effective changes 
throughout the economy. Such approaches include promotion of market linkages, value 
                                                 
‡
 Pritchett and Woolcock (2010) highlight the existence of “capability traps”. 
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chain products, business associations, microfinance, access to employment and targeted 
direct intervention in support to single industries or group of households
§
. 
  
The paper suggests a framework to evaluate how different strategies of private 
sector development impact countries‟ progress toward achieving a permanent turnaround 
out of fragility.  It highlights that – albeit stemming from different theoretical approaches 
– both regulatory and interventionist strategies are far from being mutually exclusive do 
play significant complementary roles in handling the dynamics to move out of the low-
level equilibrium and achieving a turnaround in fragile and post-conflict situations. The 
analysis supports the case for an early pro-active engagement of the post-conflict states in 
private sector development activities.  
In Section 1, taking as point of departure the way fragility, violence and conflict 
change economic structures by introducing distortions and changing incentives toward 
rent-seeking, the paper explores the way in which different private sector development 
policies support shifting economic systems from predation to production. 
We define the post-conflict economy as a rent-seeking society and assume that 
sustained economic turnaround is achieved when profit-creation incentives are higher 
than rent-seeking incentives. Private sector development policies can therefore be 
categorized into two broader typologies, depending on whether policies 
(a) target reduction of rents and opportunities for rent-seeking, or  
(b) target fostering profit-creating incentives. 
The analysis in Section 2 highlights that on the one hand, regulatory reform 
aimed at reducing rent-seeking are not less vulnerable to rent-seeking strategies than 
policies to foster profit-opportunities. On the other hand, policies that see an active role 
of the state in the development process can be designed as to minimize capture by rent-
seekers.  
Section 3 briefly discusses the implications of the framework for international 
development assistance and highlights the complementarities of private sector 
development strategies. It suggests that while most of the private sector development 
                                                 
§
 See DCED (2008) for a review. 
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policies target rent-seeking reduction, policies targeted at encouraging profit-creation can 
play a meaningful role in achieving sustained economic turnaround. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
1. Economic Turnaround as a Process of Structural Change 
 
i. Defining Economic Turnaround 
 
We owe the concept of “turnaround” to Paul Collier. A country is deemed “in 
turnaround” when policies, institutions and governance that have improved beyond the 
[World Bank] threshold for a failing state
**
, and kept beyond the threshold for at least 
two consecutive years. Achieving sustained turnaround is hence a precondition to 
permanently exiting fragility.  
Chauvet and Collier (2008) have investigated the conditions under which 
turnaround is more likely. Data shows that the likelihood for a post-conflict country to 
turnaround increases in the presence of a higher proportion of population with secondary 
education, decreases with population density and with higher level of resource rent 
relative to the GDP. The same research shows that countries presenting an important 
resource rent are less likely to achieve sustained turnaround; financial assistance also 
presents a slightly negative coefficient while technical assistance is significantly positive.  
While the literature has established the importance of sustained economic 
development to achieve “turnaround”, we‟ve not encountered a systematic exploration of  
“economic turnaround”. 
This paper attempts to use the concept of economic turnaround to explore the 
effect of private sector development on achieving sustained turnaround. For this purpose, 
we find Chand (2010) definition of economic turnaround a very valid starting point: 
incentives to production need to be stronger than incentives to predation. We 
operationalize this view by defining economic turnaround as following. 
 
                                                 
**
 As expressed by the World Bank Indicators of Country Policy and Institutions Assessment (CPIA). 
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Definition of Economic Turnaround: the state of the economy where incentives to profit-
creation are higher than incentives to rent-seeking
††
. 
 
On this basis, we elaborate a framework to explore how policies foster economic 
turnaround by incentivizing production of rent-seeking.  
We move here on a ground where the literature is scant. Economic models of 
conflict are mostly focused on exploring the drivers of conflicts (on not the drivers of 
economic turnaround), exploring contests on a given resource base, and trade-offs 
between production and violent activities. Collier and Hoeffer (2004) grievance versus 
greed model of civil conflict highlights the centrality of economic incentives (greed) in 
causing and sustaining protracted civil wars. The model was elaborated from an earlier 
justice-seeking vs loot-seeking model (Collier and Hoeffler 1999).  
While having established greed as a driver of conflict, the literature has not 
investigated how greed itself influences the dynamic of economic turnaround in the 
aftermath of conflict. Collier and Gunning (1995)
‡‡
 come close by suggesting the concept 
of “opportunism post-conflict” and pointing to the wide monopolistic rents created 
during conflict. That analysis concludes that policy be focused at making markets as 
competitive as possible, through deregulation, improved transport, and improved market 
information. The recommendation rests on the underlying assumption that competition 
will reduce rents to normal profit level, reducing the attraction of wartime traders. 
Accordingly, once the appropriate policies to reduce opportunistic behavior are applied, 
and regulation appropriately adapted, economic growth will arise, and sustaining 
economic growth will be a matter of controlling for the risk of violence still present in the 
fragile society and building the necessary institutional capabilities. Market forces will 
drive the economy into a sustained economic turnaround.  
                                                 
††
 This paper does not provide an empirical testing of this definition. Admittedly, this definition implies a 
certain degree of faith on power of the “invisible hand”: while most of the paper reject such faith in fragile 
contexts – and actually point out that such faith still predominates in most of private sector development 
policies - we believe it is a reasonable assumption to assert that, when incentives to profit-creation becomes 
dominant, the conditions are set for the rent-seeking nature of the post-conflict societies to be overcome, 
and for a sustained turnaround to take place. We leave however open the possibility that future empirical 
research might show that profit-creation incentives might need to be above a much higher threshold for 
economic turnaround to self-sustain. The framework developed in the paper is not dependent on the 
effective threshold level. 
‡‡
 In Azam et al (1995). 
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The literature lacks a systematic focus on the relevance of the important predatory 
and rent-seeking attitudes that are present in the fragile and post-war economy.  This 
paper suggests a framework that aims at filling this gap. Starting from a definition of 
post-conflict societies as “rent-seeking” societies, we‟ll explore the effects of policies on 
fostering economic turnaround. 
Unlike other frameworks, in which agents face a trade-off between production 
and conflict, we suggest that agents face a trade-offs between lively-hood activities: 
agents have incentives to choose between rent-seeking activities and productive 
activities
§§
 (profit-creation)). While the literature includes incentives to resorting to 
violence as endogenous, our framework takes resorting to violence as exogenous. We 
introduce violence and conflict in the framework in two ways: 
On the one hand, conflict and violence defines the starting point of the economy 
as “entrenched rent-seeking society”. On the other end, the link to conflict still remains 
latent through the recognition that failure to foster economic turnaround results in 
persistent fragility that can tilt the equilibrium back from production to violence. Based 
on the evidence that failure to foster economic turnaround dramatically increase the risk 
of resorting back to violence, resorting back to violence enters our framework not as 
driver but as the result of a “failed turnaround”.   
 
ii. Rent-seeking VS production and profit-creation 
 
Most of the analyses on post-conflict economies focus on the behavior of agents, 
and most notably on the trade-off between violence and production, with very limited 
focus on the economic structure of the country, which is only considered in the 
background. While they provide a good framework to analyze the dynamics of fragility 
and conflict, they do not provide detailed guidance on the different effects on incentives 
of policies aimed at supporting economic turnaround. For the purpose of this paper, we 
adopt a different view, taking the effect of protracted conflict and violence on economic 
structure and incentives as our point of departure.  
                                                 
§§
 See Neary (1997) for a review of rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict. 
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We take violence as exogenous. Economic structure and incentives are 
endogenous. We consider violence as both the ex-ante (series of) event(s) that took place 
at time T0 that generated the economic structure and incentives presents at time T1 
(identified as the start of the process of reconciliation) and the event that may take place 
within time T2, with a y% of probability to occur, if the state does not enter sustained 
economic turnaround and escape fragility status. We also assume that amidst the process 
of reconciliation, limited violence and pervasive insecurity persist and affect the economy 
well after T1. Economic turnaround affects negatively the probability of renewed 
sustained violence (type T2 events), which might imply falling back into conflict. By 
increasing resilience economic turnaround increases the probability of a successful 
achievement of the reconciliatory process and contributes to a definitive escape from 
fragility in the longer run.  
We take the effect of protracted conflict on the economic structure and incentives 
as starting point. Besides human losses and capital losses, conflict also deeply disrupts 
the economic structure of a country by impacting its factors endowment, damaging the 
hard infrastructure and the soft infrastructure of the economy, weakening the capacity, 
the authority and the legitimacy of the state, jeopardizing property rights and rule of law 
(if at all pre-existent). While protracted conflict highly disrupts the economy (stalling 
private investment and exports, destroying livelihoods and driving down wages [both in 
the accounted and unaccounted sectors] and driving up prices) economic activity does not 
halt, but goes through a transformation instead. The state shifts its focus toward increased 
military spending, and the private sector maximizes short-term gains and rents. Long-
term investment is halted, and firms shrink and lose those job-skills that supported higher 
wages
***
. People are driven into subsistence (most often informal) activities. As a result, 
incentives to predation are higher than incentives over production.  
Structurally, conflict induces inter-sectoral resource reallocations (Azam et al, 
1995). Sectors like manufacturing, which depend on immobile assets and capital, and on 
functioning markets for both production inputs and ouputs, are particularly vulnerable 
and are characterized by output collapse. Other sectors, like construction and livestock, 
are affected by shocks of the demand. 
                                                 
***
 Collier (2009), p. 93. 
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The resulting state of inefficient regulation, large illegal economy, trade barriers, 
delinquency, state budget poorly structured and executed, unreliable commercial laws 
and ad-hoc enforcement of property rights, power concentration, lack of accountability, 
politics of patronage, embezzlement of public funds, excessive level of expenses in some 
sectors (military), corruption, and exploitation of natural resources rents can be 
categorized into the broader feature of symptoms of the presence of a deeply changed set 
of incentives and structural rent-seeking
†††
.  
Incentives developed in the war economy (during the T0 period) persist well into 
the post-conflict transition (T1) making the likely-hood of further sustained violence (at 
time T2) highly likely.  
  
 
 
At T1, when the process of reconciliation begins, the economic feature of the 
country is essentially still very much one of a predatory state, where appropriation of 
income via rent-seeking is endemic and structural. Predation can extend to both legal and 
illegal activities, and takes the form of trafficking in illegal commodities (drugs, arms), 
overpricing of basic staples, perception of tolls at road-blocks, corruption in delivery of 
basic services, exploitation of natural resources through coerced labor, unavailability of 
credit at acceptable interest level. The rent-seeking nature of the society present at time 
T1 is independent from whether conflict has generated such a situation, or whether a pre-
                                                 
†††
 Collier (1999b) refers to “opportunistic behavior” and “encroachment of monopoly”. As life tends to be 
less predictable people shorten their time horizons, changing the calculus of opportunistic behavior. 
Societies become opportunistic, affecting business practices, impact profits and increasing opportunistic 
behaviors. 
Risk of violence in the absence 
of economic turnaround 
sustaining reconciliation 
Probability of Sustained Violence 
Probability of Sustained Economic Turnaround 
Time 
T1 T1+t 
100% 
“Window of opportunity for 
economic turnaround” 
Risk of violence falling when 
economy enters sustained 
turnaround 
Delayed Peace Dividend  
Probability of Economic 
turnaround 
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existing predatory state has been itself the cause of sustained violence and conflict during 
the T0 period. The resulting rent-seeking societies
‡‡‡
 extend from the state into the private 
sector.  
When not already pre-existing prior to the conflict, entrenched incentives to rent-
seeking are directly created by negative effects of sustained violence on the production 
and distribution chains, causing insufficient supply of key goods, higher prices, which 
determines a natural rent for the few remaining producers and sellers of goods. When 
conflict, violence and insecurity disrupt substantially and permanently production and 
distribution, quantities cannot respond to price increase, generating distortions that makes 
rent seeking become inherently part of the economy
§§§
, affecting it in ways not dissimilar 
to monopolistic rents, or to “institutional rents”****. 
The existence of profiteers of war and violence surplus, which extends to rebels, 
traders, businessmen and criminals, has been effectively described by Collier (1999), who 
has also sketched how the play out of those incentives might delay reaching a peace-
agreement
††††
. This effect extends to private firms as well. Research by Guidolin and La 
Ferrara (2004) using a continuous indicator of tension shows that moderate levels of 
conflict can be beneficial to some private firms, while extremely lower level of tension 
reduce their abnormal returns. This paper focuses on the persistence of this effect well 
after peace agreements are signed, and representing one of the major obstacles to entering 
sustained economic turnaround. 
By permanently reducing the level of production and disruption cross-border 
flows, destruction of infrastructure creates a persisting barrier at entry that sustains a 
monopolistic “post-conflict and violence” profiteer‟s rent focused on capturing transfers 
and earning income not directly related to productive activities.  
Individual efforts are directed at maximizing value generate social waste rather 
than social surplus, redirecting the expenditure of scarce resources towards rents, 
                                                 
‡‡‡
 As intended in this paper, “rent-seeking society” is not meant to refer to the volumetric importance of 
rents generated in the economy, rather the pervasiveness of rent-seeking behaviors, determined by the 
“short-termism‟ of agents, both public and private, in fragile states. 
§§§
 As such, economic agents tend to seek rents generated by market monopolies, natural resources rents 
and rent based on transfers (through the political mechanism). [For a full typology of rents see Khan 2000, 
p. 35]. 
****
 See Lin, Cai and Li (2003: 210) for a definition of institutional rents. 
††††
 Collier builds on his analysis to advocate policies to reduce profits from conflicts. 
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captures and transfers
‡‡‡‡
, instead of investing in means of production. Prices and output 
level are distorted and generate substantive incentives to rent-seeking. The underlying 
risk of violence and insecurity keeps the level of output and prices at distorted level, 
making rent-seeking behavior an inherently feature of economies in fragile states, and a 
major principal cause for sustained poor economic performance
§§§§
. While abandoning 
rent-seeking behavior would generate obvious long term “peace-dividends” (by pushing 
the equilibrium from D to E), the prisoner‟s dilemma nature of the situation let rent-
seeking remain a deeply entrenched reality well-after a peace-settlement has been 
reached. In fragile setting, agents to not perceive E has a credible level of activity, and 
are encourage to invest in activities that safe-guard their (post-conflict) rents and keep the 
equilibrium to D. 
 
 
The rent-seeking based economy is compounded by very strong rent-seeking and 
predatory incentives within the government institutions themselves. Fragile states fail to 
provide instruments and institutions which can adequately restrain rent-seeking. Absence 
of rule of law, property rights and lack of infrastructure, as well as insecurity, violence, 
expropriation and corruption determine an increase profitability of rent-seeking relative 
to profit-creating activities. Government activities are themselves an important source of 
activities that can be appropriated by rent-seeking, indirectly making the state into the 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡
 Buchanan and Tullock (1980). 
§§§§
 Rent-seeking societies are also characterized by talented people avoiding becoming entrepreneurs and 
joining the government bureaucracy, the army, or other organized groups (Tullock 1967) contributing to a 
negative impact on growth (Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny, 1991). 
R:“Monopolistic” 
Post-Conflict 
profiteer’s rent 
 
 
 
A 
 
Prices 
Quantity 
E 
D 
Q1 Qe 
Pe 
P1 
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“supply side” of rent-seeking. Political systems therefore come to reflect self-interest, 
interest groups, control over prices and quantities. 
As a result, in fragile states incentives to rent-seeking are typically higher than 
incentives to profit-creation. The income generating function of rent-seeking (fr) presents 
a higher profitability than function of profit seeking (fp), and the factors endowment (rR) 
devoted to rent-seeking is higher than the part devoted to production (rP). Equation [1] is 
derived from Fisher (2006): 
 
fr(rR)  >  fp(rP)  (1) 
 
 
2. Analysis of Policies to Foster Economic Turnaround 
 
i. A Taxonomy of Policies to foster Economic Turnaround 
 
From an economic structure point of view, sustained economic turnaround 
implies entering a dynamic of structural change. Following Chand (2010), we consider 
that economies enter sustained economic turnaround when incentives to production are 
higher than incentives to rent-seeking. This paper does not develop a complete formal 
model, as our purpose is not to explore the effects on the possibilities of production 
(which we assume are negative), rather more simply, to provide a framework to 
categorize different policy approaches to foster economic turnaround. 
Following Fisher (2006), a decline in relative importance of rent-seeking 
compared to profit-creation may originate either from: 
 
a. Improved ability to generate income from productive sources, i.e. an increase 
in fp to f*p, which requires a change in the profitability of the function, or in 
the composition of the factors devoted to production, r*P.  
 
f*p(r*P)  >  fp(rP)   (2) 
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b. Reduction in the profitability of rent-seeking (change in fr), which can be 
achieved either through reforms that decreases the amount of rents that can be 
extracted or by increase the cost of rent-seeking (effective in particular when 
rent-seeking is associated with illegal activities and corruption). 
 
From the proceeding, a categorization of reforms to foster economic turnaround can be 
derived, depending on which of the four parameters are aimed to be influenced by 
policies: 
I. Business environment: f*p policies that increase profitability of fp 
II. Structural change:  r*P policies that shifts positively the factors devoted to 
production
*****
 
III. Regulatory Reforms: which encompasses fr policies that decrease the amount 
of rents extracted from activities and rR policies that restrict factors 
endowment devoted to rent-seeking activities. 
 
Most of the traditional body of reforms supported by international organizations 
and donors aims at reducing rent-seeking, and can be categorized as part of type III of 
reforms. These strategies aim at curtailing the (negative) influence of the state on the 
economy to achieve greater efficiency and enhance prospects for growth and welfare by 
limiting the rents that can be captured through rent-seeking (type III).  
The recent renewed interest in private sector development in fragile setting has 
put emphasis of a new body of Type (I) policies, intended to increase the profitability of 
engaging in business activities. More recently, Type (II) policies, grounded on structural 
change, have also arisen (Lin (2009), Lin and Monga (2010)). 
 
iii. Analysis of Policies to Foster Economic Turnaround 
 
The focus on policies aimed at reducing rent-seeking has a direct affiliation with 
the traditional rent-seeking literature arisen in the seventies, which has been assuming a 
                                                 
*****
 It includes re-affecting state expenses towards economic priorities.  A key example is reduction of 
spending on the military. Collier (2006) discusses the benefit of such a reduction. 
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systematic negative impact of rent-seeking on the possibility of production. Focus on the 
negative effects of rent-seeking has culminated with Krueger (1974) demonstrating that 
the costs generated by rent-seeking attitudes themselves are higher than the net wealth 
loss due to the rent itself.  This approach rest on the strong assumptions that on the one 
hand rent-seeking almost exclusively generates net social wealth losses, and on the other 
hand that market driven profit-seeking activities can rise once the negative effects of rent-
seeking are dampened. 
Recent research investigating the relation between rent-seeking, state functions 
and violence put into question the assumption of exclusive negative effects of rent-
seeking. North et al (2009) suggests that when violence impacts negatively rents, 
maximization of rents supports arrangements that reduce violence, and induce 
cooperation. Rents are therefore an integral part of the institutions that support the 
reconciliation process. The pervasive rent-seeking incentives that govern societies at time 
T1 which need to become less prevalent than profit-creation incentives in order to achieve 
economic turnaround, are also at the base of those “Limited Access Order” institutions 
described by North et al
†††††
. Rent-seeking can support a virtuous cycle that results in 
political and economic coalitions to allow joint exploitation of rents by elites, and rents 
are therefore heart of “limited access” institutional arrangements‡‡‡‡‡. DiJohn and J. 
Putzel (2009) find that peace is more likely when elites have access to resources, and 
therefore rents, pointing to the existence of a political dynamic of growth. 
While rent-seeking is instrumental in halting sustained violence, and giving raise 
to an embryonic stable state at T1, structural rent-seeking also presents economic 
inefficiencies compromising the chances of sustained economic turnaround. Rent-seeking 
societies show a low degree of resilience, and are highly vulnerable to both internal and 
external shocks, which set off a vicious cycle that restores higher level of violence (T2 
type of events). As a result, the link between peace and economic development assumed 
                                                 
†††††
 The “limited access order” framework suggested by North et al (2009) is a valuable to provide 
insights into the dynamics of bursts of violence in fragile states. It also highlights again the importance of 
reaching a higher level of (institutional and economic) development in order to avoid the observed 
phenomenon of peace breaking again into violence within a few years. 
‡‡‡‡‡
 A striking example of importance of rent-seeking in generating equilibriums can be found in the 
abnormal returns of “Angolan” stocks, which experienced a significant drop in correspondence to the end 
of the conflict in 2002. 
17 
 
by neo-classical models is non-existent, with both the state and the private sector engaged 
in exploiting stability to extract rents instead of pursuing profitability within economic 
activities. 
North et al (2009) analysis is limited to the role of rents in institutions, and do not 
explore incentives to net value production in rent-seeking societies. Khan (2000) suggests 
a model of rent-seeking that includes positive spillover of positive social benefits, 
however production is not directly integrated into the model, and only appears as the 
additional part of the social benefit that rent-seekers aim at redistributing among 
themselves. Khan‟s model does not clearly differentiate between (rent-seeking) 
incentives that lead to predation from incentives (among which rent-seeking itself) that 
lead to production. For the purpose of this paper, and for exploring the type of policies 
that lead to sustained economic turnaround, the distinction between rent-seeking and 
profit-creation is essential
§§§§§
.  
 
iv. Policies aimed at curtailing rent-seeking - Type III Policies 
 
Policies aimed at curtailing rent-seeking include instruments to limits rents 
extraction that attempts to reproduce features of developed countries‟ regulatory 
frameworks. Type III policies aim at removing protection to rent-seeking activities most 
notably by attempting to remove barriers, generate competition, and adjusting prices. A 
subset of Type III policies aims reducing the allocation of factors of production into rent-
seeking activities by establishing barriers at entry to rent-seeking activities. Examples are 
the enactment of new laws, or strengthening the enforcement of existing laws, to combat 
the type of crime related activities often present in post-conflict situations. Other 
examples are market policies to prevent illegitimate supplies from gaining access to 
legitimate channels. 
Efforts to reduce rent-seeking are limited in the efficacy by the strong oppositions 
to reforms by rent-seekers (Buchanan 1980), and the capacity of rent-seeker to capture 
reforms themselves to generate more rents (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, 2000). The 
                                                 
§§§§§
 Khan‟s assumptions on the distributor dynamics around profits is however useful to help clarify why 
simply rent-reducing policies are not by themselves conducive of economic turnarounds, and might 
actually have destabilizing effects on the internal dynamics of fragile state‟s institutions. 
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chances of reforming established rents appear to be stronger when the reformer is 
motivated by factional interest (redistributive motives) than when motivated by the 
general interest perspective of diffusing welfare throughout society. Tollison and Wagner 
(1991) stress that this effect is particularly strong when reforming established rents, while 
policy efforts directed towards prevention of future distortions and potential rents are 
more efficient that reforms aimed at eradication of existing rents.  
Types I and III strategies rest on the assumption that in the targeted countries, 
rent-seeking by the state can be disentangled from rent-seeking behaviors in the private 
sector so that reduction of the influence from the state can have positive effects on the 
private sector and that reduction of (negative) influence of the state over the private 
sector is a priority over developing the state. This is likely not the case. The literature on 
rent-seeking has established the existence of a symbiotic and self-reinforcing relationship 
between predatory states and the rent-seeking economy. There is no evidence to support 
the hypothesis that curtailing the negative influence of a predatory state is sufficient to 
ensure that a rent-seeking society evolves into a production-driven society.  
On the other hand, research points to the need of taking into account effects on the 
dynamic of the society in the design and implementation of policies aimed at reducing 
rents to avoid adverse effects of the fragile political and social equilibrium. Recent 
insights from case studies within the institutional approach (North et al, 2010) point out 
that rents constitute a powerful element for holding together coalitions in fragile limited 
access orders. As a result, policies designed to forcefully reduced rents might increase the 
risks of ushering in new disorders and violence, while at the same time they do not 
necessarily increase profit-creation competition in the market.  
Approaching rent-seeking societies by curtailing the (negative) reach of the state, 
and aggressively pursue type III strategies aimed at reducing rents is not sufficient to 
achieve sustained economic turnaround, and presents risks of destabilizing fragile 
societies, and rent-seeking non-violent agreements between parties
******
. 
The key importance, and also the key limitation, of type of policies in fostering 
economic turnaround lay in their complementarities with other type of interventions. 
                                                 
******
 Post-conflict Cambodia resisted international financial institutions‟ advice to downsize civil service, 
as the political coalition arrangement under the peace accords was based in part on raising the size of the 
civil service to absorb large numbers of the incoming parties‟ functionaries (OED 1998). 
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While weak or absent rule of rule of law strongly compromise the capacity to effectively 
seeking profit-creation, enactment of rule of law alone, and unilateral restriction of entry 
to rent-seeking activities alone is bound to produce an increase in excess capacity in 
particular unemployment. 
 
v. Policies aimed at increasing profitability of production factors (Type I policies) 
 
Type I policies aim at increasing profitability of factors of productions. Under this 
typology fall policies aimed at removing regulatory obstacles to activities through 
strengthening the legal protection of property, making commercial contracts legally 
binding, and reforming doing business parameters.  
The strong incentives to rent-seeking that characterizes post-conflict setting 
severely limit the effectiveness of business climate policies.  Hallward-Driemeier, Khun-
Jush and Pritchett (2010) shows that African firms do not cope with policy rules, rather 
they face deals. As a result their research indicates that the gap between de jure and de 
facto respect of “Doing Business” parameters grows when a formal regulatory burden is 
added. While “Doing Business” reforms allows improving profitability de jure, in weak 
institutional environments, the actually implemented policy actions are substantially 
different, resulting in failing to reduce firms‟ uncertainties. 
Type I policies present a higher chance of achieving the desired effect when  
business environment reforms are aimed at increasing foreign investment. On the other 
hand, business environment reforms can facilitate repatriation of investment in those 
countries that present a substantial amount of private savings hold abroad. However,  
both foreign investment and repatriation are less likely if economic turnaround is not 
underway, i.e. if incentives to profits have not yet become dominant. Until then, private 
national entrepreneurs are more likely to factor in policy uncertainty
††††††
, and hold part 
of it abroad, indirectly supporting a “rent-seeking” approach to business. 
 
                                                 
††††††
 Collier and Gunning (1995) in Azam et al (1995). 
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vi. Policies aimed at increasing the part of factor endowments devoted to profit-
creation (Type II policies) 
 
In very recent years, policies to foster private sector development have expanded 
toward more interventionist approaches to encompass work on industrial sectors. A few 
donors have developed post-conflict value-chain development (USAID 2008). In view of 
the centrality that structural transformation and industrialization play in fostering 
productive incentives (and achieving higher incentives of production over rent-seeking) 
fostering structural transformation deserves an important place in the tool-box of policies 
to foster economic turnaround. However, in fragile and post-conflict situation, the 
difficulties encountered in structural change policies, are compounded by the extremely 
weak institutional setting, and the presence of a rent-seeking societies. 
Type II policies aim at increasing the part of factor endowments devoted to profit-
creation by fostering economic structural change. Type II policies are traditionally mostly 
conceived as “horizontal” policies, i.e. uniform measures that do not discriminate across 
economic sectors, but aim at creating the basis for development of economic activities 
across all sectors.  
In practice however, such policies tend to favor sectors in which the 
corresponding binding constraint is perceived as the strongest by agencies, donors and 
the government. This prioritization has been based on pragmatic approaches on the 
ground, which rely mostly on donors and governments‟ preference or comparative 
advantage in sectors of interventions, positive experiences from other countries, and 
sectoral studies. Despite the existence of forms of high prioritization in the field, type II 
policies are not underpinned by a framework of systematic policy prioritization. Rodrik 
(2004) qualifies it as “spray-gun approach”. There is a widespread reluctance to have 
governments engage in any form of “picking winners” in view of the danger of active 
development policies aimed at targeted sectors being captured by rent-seeking.  
Critics point out that granting the government greater scope is bound to increase 
rent-seeking, as rent-seeking and informational costs are a positive function of 
government scope, and point to cross-industry studies, which suggests that traditional 
industrial policy instruments do not lead to substantial productivity benefits. Rodrik 
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(2008) points out that the market failure argument for government intervention is 
overwhelming and that the informational and rent-seeking costs of government 
intervention in structural change can be ameliorated through appropriate institutional 
design of policies (embeddedness, carrots-and-sticks, and accountability).  
Policies that aims at increasing the endowment devoted to profit-creation (type II 
policies) may play an important complementary role to type I and III policies. 
If appropriately designed, structural transformation policies present a high 
potential to accelerate economic turnaround, hence reducing the risks of a return to 
violence due the vulnerability generated by protracted economic stagnation. To 
effectively support economic turnaround, Type II policies should be designed as so to 
maximizing their positive effects on profit-creation, minimizing the potential rent-seeking 
effect.  
Lin (2003) suggests that minimization of opportunities for rent-seeking can be 
obtained by limiting the state‟s facilitation role to those sectors that are compatible with 
the country‟s (latent) comparative advantage. Type II policies hence require a very early 
identification of growth sectors that present this favorable profit-creation/rent-seeking 
profile. On the other hand, Type II policies will require adopting measures
‡‡‡‡‡‡
 to protect 
the (quasi-)rents generated by first movers in the new sectors
§§§§§§
.  
 
3. Sustained Economic Turnaround and the Role of the State 
 
In the preceding section we‟ve reviewed the typology of policies of private sector 
development. We‟ve highlighted the strengths and limitations of Type I and Type III 
policies, concluding the business environment policies and regulatory reforms are not 
sufficient to generate the massive shift of incentives needed to enter a dynamic of 
sustained economic turnaround. The bulk of the current policies rests on a sets of 
regulatory reforms that aims at limiting the capacity of extraction of rents (type III 
policies) while interest on policies aimed at shifting factors toward productive and profit-
creation (type II policies) has arisen only recently. 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡‡‡
 Type I and Type III policies.  
§§§§§§
 This definition is by Brian Levy, 2010. 
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In the praxis of agencies and government, the three types of policies have come to 
be applied along a typical timeline that aims first at limiting extraction from illicit 
activities and limit rent extraction from activities through regulations (type III policies), 
and improve profitability of activities by improving business climate to foster foreign 
investment (type I policies). Type II policies are being applied on a later phase and 
mostly conceived as homogenous. Such sequencing reflects an approach to rent-seeking 
societies mostly based on the assumption that limiting rent-seeking (in particular from the 
state), can provide a fertile ground for profit-creation to arise. 
In view of the difficulties of productive activities to arise in a rent-seeking 
society, and in view of the important role that some rent-seeking plays in early 
stabilization to reduce violence, the mix and sequencing of reforms aimed at reducing 
rent-seeking and increasing profit-creation deserves further research. 
In particular further research need be devoted on the effects of reducing rents on 
states in their early stages, and the role the state can play in fostering profit-creation.  
We believe our findings are consistent with recent research showing that it is the 
capacity to generate “good policies”, and not “good governance” per se, that increases the 
likelihood of a positive economic outcome (Meisel and Aoudia, 2008). Our analysis also 
supports Collier (2006) conclusion that credible long-term economic vision contributes to 
shift incentives to longer term, more toward profit opportunities and less toward rent-
seeking short term focus.  
As pointed out by Rodrik (2004) however, while economists have perfected tools 
to evaluate policies ex post, the ability to design growth strategies remains extremely 
embryonic. A promising approach to type II policies has recently been elaborated by Lin 
and Monga (2010), who provide a framework for growth identification built on the need 
to maximizing impact of profit-making, and minimizing the risk of the rent-seeking that 
has accompanied structural change reforms in the past. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Economies in fragile situations are permeated by the negative effects of 
entrenched rent-seeking. However, engaging in aggressive policies of rent-reductions is 
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per se not enough, and presents possible destabilizing effects over the fragile social order. 
Even in fragile situations achieving a sustained level of economic growth is possible only 
through structural change and finally through achieving a minimal level of 
industrialization. As Syrquin (1988) notes, it is not a question of whether industrialization 
is necessary, but only “when and in what manner it will take place”. Hence, the 
importance of laying out groundwork to achieve a new development trajectory (UN 
2009), and create the conditions for the future structural change, right at the start of 
process of reconciliation. 
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